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Abstract   
I wish to do five things in this paper. First, I want to say 
something about the debate concerning the nature of a 
university, as prompted by Newman’s well-known 
analysis; second, I hope to show that Newman’s vision 
of the university embodies the idea of the individual 
and collective “Good” as envisaged by the Greeks; 
third, I examine some contemporary views of the kind 
of university education thought to be worthwhile; 
fourth, I aim to explore MacIntyre’s highly critical 
conception of the modern liberal university as a place 
of “unconstrained agreement”, in contrast to the 
notion of the modern pre-liberal university as a place of 
‘constrained agreement’. In doing so, I wish to give an 
account of his proposal that a university, instead, 
should be a place of “constrained disagreement” within 
which students and others are initiated into various 
arenas of cultural, ideological and curricular 
competition and conflict.  In agreeing, broadly, with 
MacIntyre’s argument, the paper ends on a rather 
bleak note, echoing Readings’ fairly recent and now 
famous analysis of the modern university as a place “in 
ruins”.  
Newman’s “Idea of a University”  
As is well-known, it was Cardinal Newman who, in the 
nineteenth century, largely set the tone of the wide-
ranging, historical debate concerning the aims and 
nature of a university. In The Idea of the University 
(1927)i there are a number of themes that Newman 
wished to pursue, as well as principles to be established 
and distinctions to be drawn. However, the central 
argument was connected with what Newman 
understood to be the two overriding virtues of a 
university, first, that within a single institution a diverse 
assemblage of disciplines could be studied purely for 
their own sakes, and second, that a host of moral and 
cultural benefits tended to accompany the very study of 
such disciplines, benefits of an intangible kind that went 
far beyond the simple acquisition of knowledge and skill. 
This is the kind of liberal education of which Hirst and 
Peters were to speak some one hundred years later 
(Hirst 1965; Peters 1966). The purpose is to initiate 
students into a world of knowledge, via the established 
disciplines, so that at some point they may come to 
understand not only the “third world” of knowledge 
contained within libraries, lecture halls and seminar 
rooms, (Popper 1972:153-163) but the actual or real 
world with which that knowledge is concerned, and the 
strange nature of the relationship between the two. For 
the student, the aim beyond that is the autonomy of 
thought and practice gained through such study, so that 
he or she may make up their own mind about the shape 
and ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §23) they might 
consider it worthwhile following.      
This is, of course, no small matter, and it is one with 
which anyone interested in the nature of education, or 
in the strange and often intangible connections between 
learning and teaching, should be concerned, for it goes 
to the heart of what it means to be a person (Langford 
1985:165-192) capable of both thinking and acting 
simultaneously, and whose thought and action takes 
account of both self and other. In the ancient Greek 
philosophical sense, making judgements about what it is 
best to do in any situation requires us to have logical, 
moral and empirical knowledge of ourselves, others and 
the extraordinary world which we all inhabit. Without 
such knowledge, our actions will be forever flawed, and 
likely to be destructive of both ourselves and of the 
community of which we are a part. The qualities of mind 
and character which are essential to the acquisition of 
such knowledge, are those, according to Newman, laid 
down by a university education.     
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A habit of mind is formed which lasts 
throughout life, of which the 
attributes are freedom, 
equitableness, calmness, moderation, 
and wisdom; or what  I … have 
ventured to call a philosophical habit. 
This then I would assign as the special 
fruit of the education furnished at a 
University. (Newman 1927:101-02) 
These “habits of mind” are a recent echo of the 
“intellectual virtues”, part of that long tradition of virtue 
ethics originally laid down in Homeric Greece and given 
a clear voice by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.ii 
The overall aim is to strengthen and refine these 
qualities so that living a life becomes a practical art 
conferring “blessedness, happiness, prosperity” 
iii
 on the 
individual, and consequently on the community within 
which the individual resides, for the Greeks saw no 
distinction between the good person and the good 
citizen; they are one and the same. And this is what is 
“Good” for oneself, and “Good” for others, the ideas of 
which are prompted by consideration of The Good 
(agathon), arguably the most important Greek concept 
of all, so it is worth our while to reflect a little on this 
notion, especially in its connection with a university 
education. 
The notion of “The Good”  
First, a university education is a “good” in itself. Its 
pursuit should be for its intrinsic or internal value, not 
for its extrinsic use. This is not, of course, to say that 
there are no external “goods” associated with a 
university education, such as easier progress towards 
gainful employment, higher social status and so on, but 
these are very much secondary. Instead the university 
student should be initiated into a form of life within 
which the point of education is understood as being for 
its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. 
Classical scholars understood only too well what was 
meant by this. The notion of a “good” (both public and 
private) derives its significance from the Platonic ideal of 
the “Good”. And for Plato, (whose Republic, arguably 
the most important text in the history of philosophy 
which raised all of the relevant intellectual questions 
that scholars, in any and every field, have ever since 
been attempting to addressiv), the “Good” was the 
overarching combination of truth, beauty and goodness, 
the ultimate aim of human knowledge and practical 
living. Once glimpsed, a person would order and 
discipline their life in such a way that the pursuit of the 
Good would supersede the pursuit of anything else. 
Hence, material wealth, social status, fame, fortune and 
pleasure would all be downgraded, as their direct 
pursuit actually impeded progress towards knowledge 
and understanding of this “miraculously transcendent” 
prize, which is the “source not only of the intelligibility 
of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and 
reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, 
and superior to it in dignity and power” (509b). It is clear 
then why Plato should have seen fit to establish what is 
probably the classic proto-type of the university, the 
Academy, a philosophical community open to both men 
and women who acknowledged the lasting value of 
intellectual inquiry (Beck 1964:227-243; Burnet 1968: 
174-187; Cherniss 1945:61-62; Lynch 1972:32-106). 
Moreover, given Plato’s eloquent and quasi-religious 
description of the Good, it is not too difficult to see why 
early Christian theology, through the extraordinary 
efforts of Augustine, annexed Platonic theorizing as a 
means of providing a philosophical justification for the 
otherwise ineffable concept of God. 
 Two millennia later Newman was equally clear about 
the anti-utilitarian nature of a university education. It 
gave students and scholars a route to understanding the 
transcendent value of human existence, and the critical 
tools to take that understanding into everyday life 
beyond the hallowed walls of the university. In short, it 
is about the very shaping of a human being, the 
development of mind and character, which may sustain 
the individual person and the collective will through the 
stresses and strains of life, as well as their peaceful 
pleasures and contented pursuits. It is hardly surprising  
then that Derwent Coleridge, ex-Cambridge scholar, 
high-Anglican priest, and the first Principal of St Mark’s 
College, one of the founding institutions of teacher 
education and training, should choose to defend the 
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teaching of ancient texts and languages, especially Latin, 
with the lines “Abeunt studia in mores” (Nicholas 2007: 
142). This summary principle of education, ‘character 
through study’, penned by Ovid in Heroides (XV 83), was 
later taken as the motto for the combined institution, 
The College of St Mark & St John, Chelsea, in 1924. 
Second, if the overall purpose of a university education 
is to provide a glimpse of ‘the Good’, then the university 
itself must embody the Good, and its community 
provide the means by which all of the “ultimate and 
synoptic questions” (Kleinig 1982: 257) can be asked 
and, at least, partially and provisionally answered; 
notwithstanding, of course, the fact that there will be 
many competing and conflicting answers. There will, 
therefore, have to be a community of scholars, all 
steeped in their respective disciplines, who are able to 
conduct a set of serious conversations about their 
tentative conclusions concerning such questions and 
answers. As Newman states, the university must 
therefore be:  
a place to which a thousand schools 
make contributions; in which the 
intellect may safely range and 
speculate, sure to find its equal in some 
antagonistic activity, and its judge in the 
tribunal of truth. It is a place where 
inquiry is pushed forward, and 
discoveries verified and perfected, and 
rashness rendered innocuous, and error 
exposed, by the collision of mind with 
mind, and knowledge with knowledge. 
(Newman 1952: 53) 
 
Newman claimed that the kinds of disciplines to be 
included in a university should be those traditionally 
studied within the four major faculties: of Law, 
Medicine, Theology, and, of course, Arts. Many of the 
new and emerging sciences were to be taught within the 
faculties of Medicine and Arts, although it is the latter 
which provides the essential foundation for a full 
university experience, given its emphasis on the seven 
“artes liberals” (Newman 1852: 53). These seven liberal 
arts, as most know, were divided into the trivium 
(grammar, rhetoric and logic), and the quadrivium 
(arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music). Their 
division and content were first sketched by the sixth 
century scholar Boethius (Watts 1999: xvii) prior to his 
long and lyrical reflections in prison, and for whom 
philosophy became his sole and ultimate consolation. 
 
Some contemporary views   
Now, depending upon who we might consult as to a 
contemporary interpretation of Newman’s ideas it is, at 
least, quite clear that the university curriculum should 
not be utterly prescribed. However, according to 
O’Hear, it would be difficult to exclude “grammar, 
mathematics, history, ... geography, poetry and 
philosophy”, and ideally the “physical and social worlds” 
should be studied through “science and literature 
respectively” (O’Hear 1988: 16).  
O’Hear extends his contemporary account by way of 
reference to another eloquent defender of the liberal 
arts curriculum. F. R. Leavis, on lamenting what he saw 
as the uncritical expansion of university education in the 
mid to late twentieth century, an expansion geared 
more to economic goals and utilitarian measures than to 
individual and collective cultural enrichment, continued 
the critique set down by Newman, and sought to fashion 
an argument that would keep alive Newman’s idea of 
the fully educated person emerging from the tradition of 
competing but complementary academic inquiries. The 
purpose should be to nurture existing institutions, and 
to establish, in a considered manner, new institutions 
which can “bring the various essential kinds of specialist 
knowledge and training into effective relation with 
informed general intelligence, humane culture, social 
conscience and political will” (Leavis 1979:4). The 
physical and human sciences are therefore necessary, 
but, given their potential for reductivism, scientism, and 
technocratic efficiency, they ought to be combined with 
the arts and humanities in order to provide the richness 
of human experience that “informed general 
intelligence” requires. (Leavis in O’Hear 1988:15) 
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O’Hear, having summarizing the positions of Newman 
and Leavis respectively, finally argues that, ‘a university 
without the disciplines of history, literature and 
philosophy cannot be a university, however prestigious 
an institution it may be’ (O’Hear 1988:18). It is an 
argument that resonates with one that Oakeshott put 
forward forcefully and lyrically in his famous essay “The 
voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind”, and it is 
worth quoting at some length what Oakeshott says of 
education in general: 
As civilized human beings, we are the 
inheritors, neither of an inquiry about 
ourselves and the world, nor of an 
accumulating body of information, but 
of a conversation, begun in the 
primeval forests and extended and 
made more articulate in the course of 
centuries. It is a conversation which 
goes on both in public and within each 
of ourselves…..Education, properly 
speaking, is an initiation into the skill 
and partnership of this conversation in 
which we learn to recognize the voices, 
to distinguish the proper occasions of 
utterance, and in which we acquire the 
intellectual and moral habits 
appropriate to conversation … (and) 
philosophy, (is) the impulse to study the 
quality and style of each voice. 
(Oakeshott 1991: 490-91).  
 
These accounts, of course, only serve to demonstrate 
that, even now, the idea of a university is still indebted 
to the idea of the medieval university, but it is none the 
worse for that. Newman, Leavis, Oakeshott, and recently 
O’Hear all retain notions of a university community, with 
its liberal arts curriculum and collegial structure, rooted 
in the medieval period when the great European 
universities were first established. Oxford and 
Cambridge, along with their older counterparts, Bologna 
and Paris, still retain their medieval charm and their 
medieval seriousness, side by side with their modern 
sciences and contemporary concerns. And whatever 
else, absolute seriousness is their chief business.  
The importance of theology  
Now, given the fact that the core discipline in the 
medieval period was scholastic theology, it is hardly 
surprising that a sobering kind of seriousness was their 
prime concern. For it was generally undisputed that 
what really mattered in the studies of humankind and 
the world was the nature of eternity. Human souls, 
bound by bodies, were, according to theological 
principle and philosophical inquiry, immortal. And if that 
is the case, then we had better be clear about what it is 
that the immortal human soul is likely to encounter in 
eternity, and whether it is possible to do anything about 
it during this brief period of mortal existence. And so, 
intellectual studies were necessarily connected with that 
vast enterprise which sees the finite clashing with the 
infinite, the mortal facing up to the immortal, and the 
changeable meeting the changeless. Theology became 
the crowned queen of the sciences, and philosophy was 
simply her “handmaid” (Hadot 1995: 107).   
Interestingly, this belief partly emerged from a quasi-
religious reading and interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics in which Aristotle referred to the three 
principal  philosophical inquiries: mathematics, science 
and theology (102ba). Of these, he claimed theology to 
be the primary discipline, since knowledge of the divine 
origins of the cosmos was solely knowledge for its own 
sake; it had no real practical benefit to the knower. It 
simply answered an insistent and intriguing question, 
the answer to which had no useful pay-off. Hence, 
theology, or first philosophy for Aristotle, is the most 
useless of all knowledge. That, however, is why it is so 
highly prized. Only those who seek to know things for 
their own sake and for no other purpose, value 
(philosophical) theology, in the way that Aristotle 
conceived it.                
Theology then, for Aristotle, was not connected to a set 
of sacred texts; it was the product of inquiring into, and 
reflecting upon the Prime Mover or Uncaused Cause. It 
was only later, most significantly, but not primarily, 
through Augustine, in The City of God, that theology, at 
least Christian theology, became indissolubly linked to 
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the sacred Hebrew and Christian scriptures.  And Holy 
Scripture then became the final arbiter in determining 
the fate of human beings, and provided the moral 
horizon for both belief and action. However, as Carr has 
neatly argued, “it was nevertheless accepted that 
understanding the Holy Scriptures presupposed a 
certain amount of secular knowledge. This was provided 
by the teaching of the celebrated seven liberal arts 
(artes liberales),”(Carr 1997 : 317) the nature of which 
has already been addressed.v 
The modern liberal university and “unconstrained 
agreement”  
What does all this tell us, if anything? What it does is to 
trace the development of the university in terms of its 
curriculum, its overarching aims, and the ways in which 
it was conceived both as a living practice and an 
institutional forum. If we are unaware as to the origins 
of academic thought and life, then we cannot be 
surprised if they are denied to us or to future 
generations. As Santayana famously remarked, “Those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it” (Santayana 1905 : 284). However, what is of 
particular significance is what the gradual changes in the 
development of the university mean for us today.  
MacIntyre has lamented the rise of what he sees as the 
modern liberal university which assumes a kind of 
neutrality on all matters moral and intellectual, 
theoretical and practical. It does so because it assumes 
that there is what he calls ‘unconstrained agreement’ 
about the nature of academic inquiry (MacIntyre 1990: 
230-231). In a postmodern academic world it is tacitly 
understood that not only competing ideologies will vie 
for supremacy, but that competing traditions and 
disciplines will construct and defend different 
conceptions of “truth”, for there is no ultimate truth 
now to be had. Hence, fundamental conflicts and 
disagreements about the nature and purpose of inquiry, 
about organizational roles and structure, and about 
competing forms of life are all unconstrained, because 
there is now no final arbiter about what we should 
choose to pursue, the manner of the choosing, and the 
means of its pursuit. Hence, and this is, effectively, 
MacIntyre’s point, we all simply and perpetually agree 
to disagree, and there is an end to it.  And so, the 
secular and the religious, the managerial and the 
collegial, the commercial and the academic, all sit side 
by side in supposed easy compatibility. For ultimately, 
there is nothing worth really defending, and nothing 
that cannot be compromised. One position is as good as 
another, and if that is the case, then any position will do, 
as it doesn’t really matter all that much. This is what 
Markham (2004) refers to as the “hotel” model of the 
university, a place where there are no overarching 
values or purposes beyond merely providing a neutral 
space for the exploration and pursuit of any kind of 
activity or form of life. All differences can be sublimated 
and all are able to conduct their academic tasks in a 
business-like fashion. There are some agreed “codes of 
practice” which (at least, on paper) govern equality (of 
race, age and gender) and resist harassment, but 
beyond that certain belief systems are largely irrelevant, 
because they are deemed not to be all that deeply-held. 
In such an academic community there is the primary 
assumption that we live broadly in a secular world, and 
if we do not, then religion or theology should be a 
purely private matter – a case for personal choice rather 
than institutional concern. And we can all agree to 
disagree in an unconstrained, liberal-ironic manner. 
The modern pre-liberal university and 
“constrained agreement” 
However, this is a very modern, indeed a very 
postmodern view. By contrast, in pre-modern and 
modern pre-liberal universities, there was a clear sense 
of “constrained agreement”, because everyone in the 
university broadly agreed about the fundamental 
importance of theology and the existence of that 
strange quasi-Greek and Jewish entity called God, even 
though they may well have disagreed about the finer 
points of God’s existence and/or nature, and the actual 
means by which these were to be investigated. But no-
one, or almost no-one, questioned or doubted the 
validating principle of the cosmos – God – and few had 
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the temerity or even the desire to question the social 
order which was tasked with articulating that validating 
principle – namely, the church universalis. Everything 
was subordinated to God, and all intellectual life was 
subordinated to God’s representatives on earth – the 
Church. Hence, the proper study for humanity was God, 
as nothing else could be seriously understood unless 
God was first acknowledged. At least, this was the case 
for Augustine and the Augustinian order. It is a view 
derived from the Platonic tradition – a glimpse first of 
the Good would provide the starting point for 
understanding things-in-themselves (that is, reality), as 
opposed to things-not-fully-themselves (that is, 
appearance). Aquinas, the other great philosopher-
theologian and textbook-writer for the medieval 
university, adopted a slightly more liberal view, one 
taken from Aristotle rather than from Plato. For 
Aquinas, as for Aristotle, we could study, learn and 
understand a great deal about this world and its 
inhabitants by the systematic observation and recording 
of the multiple ‘facts’ about us. This is the scientific or 
empirical approach, as opposed to the purely rationalist 
and idealist approach favoured by Plato and Augustine. 
For Aquinas we should largely trust the five senses to 
tell us something accurate about the world, and then 
reflect in a reasoned fashion upon such facts and 
recordings. Only later might we come to realize and 
appreciate the worth of moving from a study of the 
world to the study of God. Indeed the serious study of 
this world naturally and logically leads us to study the 
ultimate origin and meaning of this world, namely that 
entity for which the word “God” is shorthand. So, for 
Augustine, start with God and end with the world, 
whereas for Aquinas, start with the world and end with 
God, the alpha and omega of the intellectual and 
cultural life of the medieval and post-medieval world. It 
is no wonder then that there was such “constrained 
agreement” about the proper construction and scope of 
the curriculum in the founding centuries of the great 
universities of Europe.    
It took a number of radical thinkers to bring that 
constrained agreement to a close. Galileo and Descartes 
began the revolution, and Descartes’ famous assertion ‘I 
think therefore I am’ vi heralded in a new form of 
individualized inquiry which starts with the single 
thinking person, rather than with the supposed 
existence of an omniscient and omnipotent architect of 
the world and humankind, or with the dogmatic doctors 
of the Catholic church. This form of epistemological 
individualism eventually led to Kant’s great revolution in 
intellectual thought, after which God was recast as an 
intellectual concept, rather than as a living substance.  
With Kant, the standard bearer of the European 
Enlightenment movement, we start the slow process 
towards “unconstrained agreement”. Agreement was no 
longer constrained by any kind of over-arching principle, 
and rival and competing disciplines sought to make their 
claim upon the intellectual enterprise of university life. 
Competing traditions, modes of inquiry, both secular 
and religious, and competing modes of institutional 
governance all proliferated. And as no one could secure 
any firm agreement, constrained or otherwise, on 
anything, unconstrained agreement to differ was all that 
was required, As a consequence, monks no longer 
dominated the cloisters and studies; and academics of 
all creeds and none began to shape the new and 
evolving institutions, 
 Once religion had been relegated to the chapel only, 
and once a realm of transcendent value had been 
confined to the private study, it ushered in an era of 
“unconstrained agreement”, because no-one needed 
constraining; any actual disagreements were bound to 
be perpetual and largely of little consequence so long as 
financial and academic preferment governed the 
institutions. And along with the inexorable rise of the 
‘”bureaucratic manager” in general culture, (MacIntyre 
1985:73-77; 107-08) the rise of the academic manager 
has replaced that of the scholar-monk. It is no wonder 
that the great theology faculties have now been 
supplanted by the towering and newly-resplendent 
faculties of business and management. The death of one 
god simply meant the birth of another. Or rather the 
abandonment of a monotheistic concern with God has 
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led to the polytheistic concerns of many gods: wealth, 
status, utility, efficiency, and so on. The new priesthood 
comprises economists, technologists, scientists, and 
strangely, and for very different reasons, 
postmodernists.   
 
 
A possibility: a university of “constrained 
disagreement” and the nature of conflict  
It is hardly surprising then that institutions of higher 
education, namely universities and university colleges 
are in a state of some crisis. Many if not most have lost 
their nerve in the face of financial pressures, 
bureaucratic interference, political pleading, league 
tables, quality audits and so on. The overarching aims of 
the university as once they were known, articulated and 
embodied have all but been forgotten. What then is to 
be done, in the absence of any clear understanding of 
the moral and intellectual purposes of a university? 
MacIntyre provides us with an answer, although it is by 
no means the only one: 
What … is possible? The answer is: 
the university as a place of 
constrained disagreement. Of 
imposed participation in conflict, in 
which a central responsibility of 
higher education would be to initiate 
students into conflict (MacIntyre 
1990:231).         
But conflicts about what exactly? Conflicts of a curricular 
kind certainly, and conflicts about the precise aims and 
purposes of a university education. As the Australian 
philosopher, John Anderson, once claimed, we should 
not “ask of a social institution: ‘What end or purpose 
does it serve?’ but rather, ‘Of what conflicts is it the 
scene?’” (source: MacIntyre 1985:163).  And what 
outcomes are the result of such conflicts?  The 
contemporary academic may, in curricular terms accept 
the previously hinted-at postmodern view:  that 
actually, despite the conflicts, it doesn’t matter too 
much if we abandon philosophy, history and geography, 
for none of them have any more educational legitimacy 
than urban planning, enterprise studies, and marketing.  
There is nothing which ultimately distinguishes one 
subject from another, except, perhaps, popularity. But 
interestingly, whilst subscribing to the postmodernist 
view in curricular terms, the contemporary academic 
often subscribes to a bureaucratic and managerialist 
view in organizational terms: there is a single, uniform 
structure and mode of operation that “optimises” 
learning, teaching and assessment. Hence, the search 
for systems, usually of a technological and technical kind 
that will normalize academic behaviour and inquiry, and 
provide universal and objective means of measuring 
performance, output and standards.  
For MacIntyre, however, there is an intellectual tradition 
which recognizes that world views and modes of 
intellectual inquiry will always be in competition and 
sometimes in conflict, but that nonetheless, this 
particular tradition has withstood external critique, 
accommodated new insights from alternative traditions, 
and has accumulated a wealth of knowledge and modes 
of inquiry which allow its adherents, “those who have 
thought their way through topics of justice and practical 
rationality, from the standpoint constructed by and in 
the direction pointed out first by Aristotle and then by 
Aquinas, … every reason at least so far to hold that the 
rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in its 
encounters with other traditions …” (MacIntyre 1988: 
402-03). That tradition is Thomist (after Thomas 
Aquinas), the ongoing synthesis of Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophies (still providing the fundamental 
fault-line in western intellectual culture), through the 
philosophical theologies of Augustine and Aquinas 
respectively. It is Thomist on the grounds that, (as we 
have already seen), the Aristotle-Aquinas position 
encourages substantial secular inquiry before finally 
acknowledging the fact that the human perspective is, 
and always will be, restricted, finite, incomplete and 
imperfect, but that, it is still worth trying to excavate a 
realm of knowledge, value and meaning that may well 
lie beyond our straightforward material understanding. 
Moreover, it is a realm of meaning that cannot simply be 
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dismissed as a form of faith requiring no reason, but a 
form of reason that finally understands the importance 
of faith – not a literal faith concerned with supernatural 
explanations, but one that acknowledges the fact that all 
of the great world-faith traditions embody a set of 
symbolic truths about the human condition. It is this 
philosophical Thomist tradition that seemed, broadly, to 
have informed the high Anglican belief system of the 
aforementioned Revd. Derwent Coleridge, the first 
Principal of St Mark’s College.     
To return, these conflicts, into which students should be 
initiated, provide the deeper foundations for the 
present set of conflicts that characterize, to a greater or 
lesser degree, all institutions charged with the 
responsibility of educating the individual and collective 
student. And what kinds of conflicts might there be? We 
have hinted at them already. They are, to a degree, the 
same for all contemporary centres of learning and 
teaching. The conflicts between the secular and the 
religious in intellectual life, between the liberal and 
vocational (broadly conceived on the one hand, and 
narrowly conceived on the other) in the curriculum 
offered; between the managerial and the collegial in the 
organizational structure, and the academic and the 
commercial in terms of the overall value conferred upon 
a university education. 
But there are additional conflicts both between and 
within the multifarious disciplines governing intellectual 
life. Newman, Leavis and O’Hear speak eloquently of the 
competing values accorded to, say, literature and 
philosophy, science and medicine. What, in a university, 
must be admitted, and what can be discarded? And 
even within disciplines, as everyone knows, there are 
rival positions, exemplified by the ongoing and 
unedifying dispute in philosophy between the 
continental phenomenological, and the Anglo-American 
analytic traditions (Glendinning 2006:9-17; 69-84). Often 
such disputes emerge from the biographies of individual 
scholars which intersect with the histories of 
institutions, coupled with the fashionable successes of 
individual disciplines.  
  Having said all of this, can Newman’s original vision be 
strengthened at all? Indeed, has it fallen so far out of 
fashion that it can no longer be resurrected? The 
prospect looks rather bleak, although MacIntyre has 
pointed out that the vast theoretical and practical 
resources laid down by Greek and Roman culture were 
maintained and cherished by the Catholic church in its 
newly-established monasteries, whilst the assorted 
tribes of Goths and Vandals laid waste to life, love and 
learning beyond their walls. And as he later claims,  
 What matters at this stage is the 
construction of local forms of 
community within which civility and the 
intellectual and moral life can be 
sustained through the new dark ages 
which are upon us. And if the tradition 
of the virtues was able to survive the 
horrors of the last dark ages, we are not 
entirely without grounds for hope. This 
time, however, the barbarians are not 
waiting beyond the frontiers; they have 
already been governing us for quite 
some time. (MacIntyre 1985:263) 
Specifically in relation to the contemporary university, 
Bill Readings has undertaken a similar analysis, and 
reaches a similar conclusion: we desperately need new 
academic communities wedded to a mode of thought 
and action largely unhampered by the current 
Weltanschauung of utilitarian goals, managerial 
systems, and shallow league tables derived from 
misrepresented statistics. There are possibilities, but if 
they are not explored, then the university may well 
remain “in ruins” (Readings 1997). 
But, a word of caution: we should not be too pessimistic 
or we would rightly be judged as being solely backward-
looking, guilty of the worst form of conservatism, 
instead of attempting to be forward-looking, adopting 
the acceptable face of pragmatism. Whatever else a 
university is, or whatever else it has become, it does at 
least provide some kind of a contested forum for an 
educated public, and a locus for a community of 
inquirers. And postmodernity, whatever its problems, 
can often provide the practical as well as the theoretical 
means for the strengthening of the university as a place 
of constrained disagreement, albeit perhaps 
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unintentionally. Otherwise, presumably, a somewhat 
gloomy piece such as this (quite apart from its many 
technical faults) would have failed even to have seen the 
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i The book grew out of a series of lectures or ‘discourses’ 
given by Newman, first, upon being asked to fashion the 
principles and curriculum for a Catholic University in 
Dublin in 1852, and second, after being appointed to the 
Rectorship at Dublin 1854-58. 
ii It is generally agreed that Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics is probably one of the most profound and 
influential texts in the history of moral philosophy, and 
is as relevant today as it was two millennia ago. 
iii This is MacIntyre’s (1985 : 148) translation of the 
Greek eudaimonia which is often (mis)translated as 
simply ‘happiness’. 
iv For a short and exceptionally readable account of the 
central importance to western culture of this text see 
Blackburn (2006). 
v For a full treatment of the development of the 
medieval university, and the relationship between 
theology and philosophy within it, see, for example, 
Gilson (1955: 246-250); Taylor (1966: 408-425), and 
Evans (1993). 
vi ‘I think, therefore I am’ is the well known formulation 
found in Discourse on Method (1968:53), whereas the 
expanded and more formalised version is to be found in 
the famous Second Meditation, ‘I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it 
in my mind’(1968 : 103). 
